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Abstract: The part of electronics in automobile 
design becomes more and more important with an 
exponential growth during the last 10 years. 
Nowadays, innovation in automotive industry is 
driven by electronics. New upcoming 
electrical/electronic systems (E/E systems) such as 
advanced driver assistance systems or x-by-wire 
systems as well as consumer expectation regarding 
safety will require a dedicated standard to ensure 
design, development and production of safe 
products before their introduction on the market.  
ISO/TC22/SC3/WG16 has been formed to issue the 
ISO26262 international standard that will specifically 
address functional safety of E/E systems of 
automotive industry. 
This paper provides information about the future 
ISO26262 which is based on the current results of 
ISO/TC22/SC3/WG16 [1], those still being subject to 
changes before the international standard release.  
Keywords: Automotive E/E systems, functional 
safety, IEC61508, ISO26262 
1. Introduction 
The use of E/E systems in the automotive industry 
has significantly increased over the past few years. 
Nowadays, it represents approximately 30% of the 
value of new vehicles [2].  
E/E systems enable introduction of more and more 
complex and sophisticated functions inboard of 
vehicles, ranging from low-emission and low-fuel 
consumption engine management systems to high-
performance stability control for chassis or advanced 
driver assistance systems. 
In case of malfunction, such system could have the 
potential for endangering the vehicle occupants or 
other road users. One major task of designers is to 
identify such hazardous conditions, determine their 
potential causes, e.g. hardware device failure, 
design flaw or weak manufacturing process, and 
mitigate or reduce the associated risks to an 
acceptable level in order to keep the E/E systems 
safe, even in case of malfunction. 
How safe is safe enough? An answer to this 
question is given by the application of current state-
of-the-art. 
Industries with early and deep safety culture have 
defined and maintain their own state-of-the-art 
through standards. That is the case of Aeronautics 
with ARP 4754 [3], DO-178B [4], and DO-254 [5], as 
well as Railways with EN 5012x series [6].  
The world-wide automotive industry represented 
within the ISO/TC22/SC3/WG16 is in the process of 
establishing such a state-of-the-art with ISO26262 
project.  
The ISO26262 project is dedicated to the functional 
safety of automotive E/E systems, where functional 
safety is a state in which vehicle functions 
implemented by E/E systems do not present any 
intolerable risk resulting from: 
• Specification, implementation or realization 
errors, 
• Failure during operation period, or 
• Reasonably foreseeable misuse or operational 
errors. 
2. Overview and principles 
2.1 Adaptation of IEC61508 
ISO26262 is intended to be the adaptation of 
IEC61508 [7] to the automotive industry.  
The IEC61508 standard entitled “Functional safety of 
Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic safety 
related systems” was primarily originated by process 
and automation industries. Since 1998 it is used as a 
stand-alone standard and also as a basis for 
establishing other sector or product standards. 
Attempts of application of IEC61508 in automotive 
industry in the past have shown some weaknesses, 
including: 
• A poor suitability to real-time embedded 
systems, 
• No adaptation to automotive development and 
life cycles, 
• No description of OEM / supplier relationships, 
• No orientation to mass production of consumer-
goods. 
Moreover, additional characteristics of the 
automotive industry have to be taken into account in 
this adaptation: 
• There is no likely catastrophic event in the 
automotive industry: without additional 
aggravating circumstances a single failure in a 
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road vehicle cannot lead potentially to as many 
casualties as a train or industrial plant accident; 
therefore the safety scale needs to be adapted. 
• The E/E systems and functions inboard of 
vehicles are often used by drivers without any 
knowledge other than their basic driving habits, 
coming back to their driver’s license. Moreover, 
there is no monitoring of vehicle maintenance: 
taking a car to garage for periodic service is not 
mandatory. However, safety of the vehicle needs 
to be ensured. 
• Innovation comes as often from the suppliers as 
from the OEMs, the standard must address the 
specificity of the automotive development 
process of the automotive industry. 
 
2.2 Scope of ISO26262 
ISO26262 is restricted to functional safety of E/E 
systems installed in road vehicles of class M, N and 
O, namely: 
• Motor vehicles with at least four wheels 
designed and constructed for the carriage of 
passengers, 
• Motor vehicles with at least four wheels 
designed and constructed for the carriage of 
goods, 
• Trailers (including semi-trailers). 
For this purpose, ISO26262 gives guidelines how to 
take into account system, hardware as well as 
software failures and to control their potential effects 
on vehicle safety. However, ISO26262 does not 
address performance of E/E systems; e.g. the 
effectiveness of an airbag to reduce the injuries of 
vehicle occupants in case of crash is out of the 
scope of ISO26262, while features designed to avoid 
unexpected deployment of the airbag are in. 
 
2.3 ASIL – Automotive safety integrity level 
ISO26262 introduces a four-level ranking for 
functional safety risks, so called Automotive Safety 
Integrity Levels or ASILs which is derived from the 
SIL scaling of IEC61508. The highest level of 
IEC61508 (SIL4) is not applicable to automotive for 
reason previously mentioned; thus there is no direct 
correspondence between ASILs and SILs.  
ASIL assigned to an E/E system depends on 
potential consequences of its malfunctions. The 
ASIL defines the nature and rigor of measures to be 
applied for ensuring functional safety of this E/E 
system. 
 
2.4 Random and systematic failures 
ISO26262 addresses two types of failures:  
• Systematic failures that are caused by faults 
introduced in specification, design, 
implementation, industrialisation, etc. They can 
affect system, software and hardware 
components. Each time a fault is activated, it 
puts directly the corresponding component on 
the failure path. Systematic failures are mainly 
avoided by applying rigorous measures to 
prevent introduction of faults as well as 
measures for detecting them at each step of the 
development of components. 
• Random failures that affect only hardware 
components. They are due to physical factors 
such ageing or wear. Random failures can occur 
at any time during the useful life period of any 
hardware component used in its normal range. 
They are controlled through appropriate design 
measures such as redundancy and on-line 
diagnostics and constrained through 
architectural metrics. 
 
2.5 Safety lifecycle 
ISO26262 adopts a lifecycle-oriented view of 
functional safety, like IEC61508: it describes what 
kind of tasks and deliverables are expected to 
ensure functional safety during the different phases 
of life of E/E systems, from the concept to the end-
of-life, through design, production, operation, and 
maintenance. 
It begins with definition of the “item”. The term “item” 
generically designates a function, an E/E system, or 
a component that is to be taken under consideration. 
Its definition includes functionalities, operating 
modes and conditions, environment, etc. 
Next is the identification of the “safety goals”, i.e. the 
conditions to be maintained at item level in case of 
failure to avoid unacceptable risk (see section 3). A 
“safety goal” corresponds to the positive wording for 
a safety-related undesired event of an item. An ASIL 
is attributed to every safety goal. 
The functional safety concept of the item is the first 
step of the design of the safety architecture of the 
item (see section 4.1). It is a set of requirements 
applying to the different parts of the architecture of 
the item to guarantee its safety. It covers the 
potential failures of the different parts of the item. It 
may also refer to mechanical or other technologies 
parts, which are out of the scope of ISO26262. 
The technical safety concept implements the 
functional safety requirement (see section 4.3) on 
system architecture. It also allocates the technical 
safety requirements to hardware (see section 5) and 
software (see section 6).  
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Safety-related special characteristics identified 
during system, hardware and software development 
are monitored during the production of the item (see 
section 7). 
In addition to this core technical process, the 
ISO26262 standard adds some requirements on the 
management (see section 8). 
3. Hazard assessment and risk analysis 
As stated before, the aim of the ASIL evaluation is to 
provide the industry with a robust way of assigning a 
level of safety effort to the item under consideration. 
This is the reason why the methods and parameters 
to be taken into account are explicitly mentioned in 
ISO26262: it is the best way to avoid discrepancies 
between evaluations performed by different teams 
with different methods. 
The ASIL evaluation is performed at the vehicle 
level. The target of this evaluation is to evaluate the 
risk level on a graph “severity vs frequency” ; the 
ASIL level and the associated measures described 
in the standard will enable the system to reach the 
“acceptable area”. 
 
 
The first step is to identify the safety goals for the 
item to be considered throughout the development. 
For this purpose, after having established the 
functionalities of the item, an analysis of the effect of 
its failures on the vehicle shall be performed. 
A scenario tree shall be established to identify the 
situations in which such a failure may have safety 
impacts. For each scenario, the effects of failure of 
the item are evaluated on the severity/frequency 
graph.  
Frequency has been decomposed in Exposure and 
Controllability. Therefore three parameters are 
evaluated:  
• Exposure: this is the occurrence of the driving 
situation in which a failure in the item may be 
dangerous during the life of the vehicle. It is 
ranked from E1 (very low probability, such as the 
occurrence of a crash during the lifetime of the 
vehicle) to E4 (very often / always, such as 
driving on a motorway) with a roughly ten-time 
increase in probability from one step to the next. 
• Controllability: this is the estimation of the 
ability of the driver to control the effects of the 
feared event if it occurs. It is ranked from C0 
(any driver can control the event, the skills 
required to get a driver’s licence are sufficient) to 
C2 (Less than 90% of drivers are able to control 
the event). This parameter is evaluated through 
expert advice and/or novice tests. A Code of 
Practice on the evaluation of controllability in the 
automotive industry has been published in the 
European Project PReVENT/Response 3 [8]. 
• Severity: this is an evaluation of the criticality of 
the consequences of the event if the driver was 
not able to control it in a potentially dangerous 
driving situation. It is ranked from S0 – no 
consequences to S3 - Life-threatening injuries 
(survival uncertain), fatal injuries. 
The ASIL evaluation for each scenario is given 
through a risk graph implemented in a table in the 
standard. The ASIL level of the safety goal is the 
maximum ASIL reached for the different scenarios. 
Tolerable Risk = F (Severity, Frequency) 
Exposure * Controllability * Failure rate S 
C E ASIL
Not acceptable
risk area
Acceptable 
risk area 
extremely 
remote 
negligible 
catastrophic 
frequent Frequency 
S
e
v
e
r
i
t
y
An item whose failure would be often dangerous 
(E4), difficult to control (C2), and with severe 
consequences (S3) would be ASIL D; any change in 
the evaluation of a parameter will decrease the ASIL 
evaluation, down to QM (Quality Management): at 
this level, the usual quality management activities 
performed in a non-safety development are 
considered sufficient to handle properly the item. 
In addition to each safety goal, the appropriate safe 
states shall be described. 
The safety goal classification implies several system-
wide requirements: 
• To apply activities and method to avoid 
systematic failures, at the selected ASIL level, 
• To introduce safety mechanisms to control 
random hardware failures. Quantitative targets 
are required for ASIL levels B, C and D with 
regard to the coverage of these safety 
mechanisms. Quantitative targets are also 
required for the probability of occurrence of 
random hardware failures for ASIL C and D. 
4. Functional safety at system level 
After having established the safety goal and its ASIL 
evaluation, it is time to proceed with the system 
design. 
The target is to establish a functional and technical 
safety concept for the item. 
The first step is to describe the architecture concept 
of the item. It is a plan representing the different 
Initial risk 
(External measures, 
other technologies) 
ASIL and associated 
measures 
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elements of the item. It shall include all the electronic 
elements that may have an impact on safety. 
It may also include mechanical or other technologies 
elements if the are relevant; however, ISO26262 will 
not prescribe requirements to develop these 
elements. 
 
4.1 Functional safety concept 
This is the first step of the design of functional 
safety. 
Based on the architecture concept, it describes what 
is expected from each component to maintain the 
safety goal even in case of failure: 
• Diagnostic requirements: ability to perform a 
diagnostic, failure types covered, timing, etc. 
• Requirements on the transition to a safe state: 
availability of safety mechanisms, timings, etc. 
• Requirement on driver information: warning 
lamps, messages, etc. 
The functional safety concept shall be verified to 
avoid the introduction of systematic failures. This 
may be done through 
• Inspection of the safety requirements by another 
person, 
• Simulation of behaviour of the item including the 
functional safety requirements, 
• Vehicle or system-level tests on a demonstrator. 
 
4.2 ASIL allocation 
One of the outcomes of the functional safety concept 
is that each functional safety requirement shall be 
assigned an ASIL level, and shall be allocated to an 
element of the architecture of the system. 
Basically, each element shall be assigned the ASIL 
level of the safety goal. 
However, ISO26262 offers a possibility named ASIL 
decomposition: it allows to take into account the 
architecture of the item to alleviate the ASIL level at 
the element level for the avoidance of systematic 
faults, if : 
• They implement redundantly the same safety 
requirement, 
• They are independent from each other (no 
common cause of failure). 
Some important points shall be noted : 
• This ASIL decomposition mechanism only deals 
with measures related to systematic failures. 
The random hardware failures are allocated 
independently to the elements of the 
architecture, following other rules (Fault tree 
analysis for instance). 
• The confirmation and verification measures shall 
be applied at the initial ASIL (the ASIL of the 
safety goal). 
 
4.3 Technical safety concept 
The Technical Safety Concept describes how the 
functional safety concept is technically implemented 
in the item, for every element of the architecture. 
For instance, if the functional safety concept requires 
the diagnostic of a certain element, its type, its 
coverage, along with its frequency, shall be 
described in the technical safety concept. Other 
examples include the allocation of probability of 
violation of the safety goal to the hardware elements. 
The technical safety concept shall also specify the 
test intervals for the safety mechanisms (e.g. at each 
power-up of the vehicle). 
The system design and its technical safety concept 
shall be verified through a safety analysis such as a 
system-FMEA, and by simulation or vehicle-level 
tests.  
The Technical safety concept and its requirements 
shall be developed down to the allocation between 
hardware and software of each element. 
 
4.4 Verification and validation of functional safety 
The implementation of the technical safety concept 
shall be verified through tests at the relevant level 
(system, software, hardware). It can include test of 
the implantation against the technical safety 
requirements, errors injection, validation on test 
benches including HIL, etc. 
Moreover, the safety concepts shall be validated at 
the vehicle level at the end of the development, 
before the release for production. 
This validation shall cover the controllability, the 
safety measures used to control systematic and 
random failures, etc. 
5. Functional safety at hardware level 
The goal of this phase is to implement the 
requirements of the technical safety concept 
allocated to the hardware. Both systematic and 
random hardware failures have to be considered in 
this phase. 
 
5.1 Hardware development process 
Development of hardware is divided into several 
activities: 
• Safety specification of the hardware: the target is 
to come up with a set of hardware safety 
requirements, implementing the technical safety 
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concept. They shall be verified to be consistent 
and exhaustive. 
• Hardware design: it shall implement the 
hardware safety requirements.  
• A safety analysis shall be applied to identify: 
o Single point faults. 
o Dual point faults (faults in a component that 
result in the violation of the safety goal in 
conjunction with another fault in another 
component.  ) 
o Compliance with targets for probabilistic and 
coverage metrics for the hardware 
• Components qualification and hardware 
validation: the standard relies on well-proven 
test methods, such as environment testing, 
functional testing, over limit testing, fault 
injection testing, and corresponding standards 
(e.g. ISO 16750, etc.). 
 
5.2 Measures for systematic failures of hardware 
For the avoidance of systematic failures, this part of 
the standard relies on strict development methods, 
including semi-formal methods for specification for 
ASIL C and D. 
The standard also promotes the use of HW design 
simulation for ASIL C and D. 
 
5.3 Probability target for hardware random failures  
A probabilistic evaluation of the safety risk due to 
random hardware failures is mandatory for ASIL C 
and D. 
This evaluation may be done directly at the system 
level, for instance through a quantitative fault tree. 
This evaluation shall take into account both single 
point faults and multiple point faults. It shall also take 
into account the diagnostic frequencies of the 
different parts of the hardware. 
 The target for this evaluation can be derived from 
different sources: 
• Either an evaluation of a suitable existing 
design, or 
• An informative table given in annex of the 
standard. The target is an average failure rate 
per hour over the lifetime of the vehicle; it is set 
at 10-8 per hour for ASIL D systems and 10-7 per 
hour for ASIL C systems. 
It can also be done at component level: for ASIL D 
system, identified single points failures must have a 
failure rate of 10-10 per hour if the diagnostic 
coverage for this single point failure is below 90%. 
Corresponding probabilistic targets are derived for 
better diagnostic coverage and multiple point 
failures. 
 
5.4 Architecture targets for hardware random failures  
An evaluation of the diagnostic coverage at the 
system level is also required by the standard for 
ASIL C and D. It is an adaptation of the Safe Failure 
Fraction of IEC 61508. 
Two metrics are defined in ISO26262. 
They are both calculated as ratios of failure rates; 
this improves their robustness against doubts in the 
absolute values of failure rates derived from 
databases or from field observation. 
They only apply to safety-relevant components; 
these are components whose at least a failure mode 
may impair safety. This avoids modifying the metrics 
by taking into account components unrelated to the 
safety of the hardware under consideration. 
The first metric is named “Single point faults metric”. 
It is defined as the ratio of the failure rates of safety 
related elements which fail in a safe state (either 
inherently by design, or through a diagnostic 
mechanism) to the sum of the failure rates of safety 
related components in the hardware of the item. 
It can be illustrated as follows: 
 
 
R 
Faults leading to a safe state 
through a safety mecanism
Safe faults 
 
If R are the faults leading directly to a violation of the 
safety goal (esp. the single point faults without 
diagnostic), the metric is defined as 
FSR
FSSPFM ++
+=  
The target for this metric is set at 99% of coverage 
for ASIL D systems, as a mandatory requirement. 
Lower ASIL levels have adapted requirements. 
A second metric is dedicated to latent faults. It aims 
to minimize the proportion of latent faults that are not 
indicated to the driver and might impair its safety in 
the long run. Undetected loss of a safety mechanism 
falls into this category: it is generally not directly 
dangerous but reduces the safety of the driver 
because a further fault in the system may be 
dangerous. 
This metric is defined in a similar way as the 
previous one; it is the ratio of the failure rate of the 
multiple point faults which are perceived by the 
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driver (generally indicated by a warning lamp) to the 
sum of the failure rates of the system. 
The target for this metric is set at 90% of coverage 
for ASIL D systems, as a mandatory requirement. 
Lower ASIL levels also have adapted requirements. 
Since the efficiency of diagnostic measures is a 
crucial point for both the probabilistic and the 
coverage evaluations, a table of usual measures is 
given in ISO26262 as general guideline. 
6. Functional safety at software level 
Like in any other sectors of industry, software used 
in automotive industry is subject to systematic 
failures, but not to random failures. Such systematic 
failures are mainly due to faults introduced in 
software during development or industrialization. 
They can potentially lead or contribute to the 
violation of safety goals assigned to automotive E/E 
systems.   
ISO26262 will provide a set of ASIL-dependent 
measures to be applied during development that 
aims at: 
• Preventing the introduction of faults in software,  
• Detecting the ones that could have been 
introduced. 
There are no quantitative targets assigned to 
software since software is not subject to random 
failures. 
 
6.1 Software development process 
For the purpose of fault avoidance, the description of 
software development process proposed in 
ISO26262 relies on academic V-cycle model. The 
development of software starts with the specification 
of software safety requirements once the technical 
safety requirements of E/E system are mapped on 
hardware and software components. It ends with 
software safety acceptance testing which is part of 
the safety validation of E/E system. 
The other basic phases of software development 
are:   
• Software architectural design, 
• Software unit design and implementation, 
• Software unit testing, and 
• Software integration and testing. 
Sequencing and arrangement of those phases and 
their corresponding activities, methods and tools 
need to be planned and tailored prior to their 
execution or use. Tailoring depends on 
characteristics of software under consideration: it is 
new software to be developed, or software is entirely 
or partly reused, or COTS is to be integrated, etc. 
Additionally, the use of specific software or system 
engineering techniques such as model-based 
development or auto-coding has also an impact on 
the initiation of the software development that need 
to be planned at the very beginning of software 
development.   
 
6.2 Co-existence of software with different ASILs 
Because ISO26262 focuses on functional safety of 
E/E systems, one may think that software 
development phases only apply to the safety-related 
part(s) of software. Moreover, some phases such as 
the specification of software safety requirements or 
the software safety acceptance testing are only 
dedicated to the safety-related parts of software 
while others such as software architectural design or 
software integration and testing need to encompass 
software as a whole. Basically, in case of co-
existence of safety-related software components 
with non-safety-related software components or in 
case of software components assigned with different 
ASILs in the same running environment, the 
complete software has to comply with the highest 
ASIL inherited from the technical safety 
requirements of E/E system unless freedom of 
interference between those components can be 
demonstrated.  
Interference means that a failure of a non-safety-
related component potentially causes other safety-
related component(s) to fail, respectively a failure of 
a component with lower ASIL causes other 
component(s) with higher ASIL to fail.  
Demonstration of freedom of interference between 
software components can be supported by the use 
of partitioning techniques.   
 
6.3 Measures for systematic failure of software 
Basically, the measures for preventing introduction 
of faults in software promote modularity, traceability 
with upstream work products and control of 
complexity. Among others, the formalism of notation 
to be used for work products varies with ASIL. 
The measures for detection of faults in software 
apply to work products as well as for software under 
its executable form.   
Work products are checked for compliance and 
completeness regarding upstream work products 
they are issued from. Attributes such as correctness, 
consistency and adequacy with target hardware are 
also checked.  
Additionally, potential failures of software are 
analysed at design and implementation level in order 
to determine how they could impair the software 
safety requirements or introduce hazards that have 
not yet been identified by previous safety analyses.  
Similarly to some other safety standards, testing of 
software is mainly driven by functional requirements. 
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Completeness of functional requirement-based 
testing is assessed through coverage of structure of 
software. The nature of structures to be covered 
(e.g. statement, decision, etc.) varies with ASIL.   
 
6.4 Hardware-software interfaces 
Regarding functional safety, hardware-software 
interface encompasses hardware resources that 
support execution of software as well as hardware 
devices controlled by software for the 
implementation of technical safety requirements of 
an E/E system. ISO26262 will provide guidance to 
ensure that adequate information is timely made 
available, shared and jointly verified by hardware 
and software development.   
 
6.5 Calibration data 
Software-based E/E systems in automotive industry 
are usually targeted for more than one vehicle or 
engine configuration or variant, e.g. a vehicle is 
equipped or not with cruise control, or with automatic 
gear box instead of manual one, or a system has to 
fit with different types of sensors or actuators, etc. 
For ensuring an adequate system performance and 
vehicle driveability for every application, an 
adaptation to each running environment is 
necessary. This is done with calibration data which 
tuning provides correct values for configuration-
specific system, engine or vehicle parameters.   
ISO26262 will provide guidance for identification and 
management of safety-related calibration data as 
well as for verification of applications that use such 
calibration data.   
7. Production and operation 
The functional safety also relies on proper 
production and operation of E/E systems and 
components. 
ISO26262 requires that the safety-related special 
characteristics of elements shall be identified during 
the development process. These are characteristics 
of elements or systems for which uncontrolled 
deviation may lead to safety consequences. 
These characteristics shall be guaranteed to be 
within the tolerance in the production process, for 
instance through individual tests of each component. 
The automotive industry has a deep background with 
this kind of requirement, since it also applies to most 
safety-related mechanical components. 
The configuration management and management of 
calibration data are of prime importance; the 
production in automotive industry is often 
surprisingly diverse and improper configuration of 
the vehicle or component could lead to unpredictable 
results (e.g. when a software is uploaded to the 
wrong version of hardware). 
The next step is the operation of the E/E system by 
the customer. He will often need information on how 
to use the system, how to act when a warning lamp 
lights up, etc. This shall be included in the customer 
documentation. 
Relevant maintenance and decommissioning 
instructions shall also be issued for the workshops. 
8. Functional safety assurance 
ISO26262 will not only focus on technical aspects of 
functional safety, it will also address safety 
assurance of E/E automotive systems at 
organisational and project level. 
 
8.1 At company level 
Company duty includes setting policy and defining 
goals for achievement of functional safety. Policy 
includes statement of general policy and company-
specific rules and processes in order to comply with 
ISO26262 especially in the field of independent 
safety assessment, problem tracking and reporting, 
and lesson learning. 
It also implies installation of processes for in-field 
monitoring, reporting and handling of safety-related 
incidents once the product is put on the market, 
those being in line with general product safety 
regulations such as European directive 2001/95 and 
US Tread Act. 
Appropriate organisational structure will have to be 
set up in order to support responsibility, 
accountability of functional safety and grant 
corresponding authority. 
Moreover, people with adequate expertise and skill 
on functional safety of E/E automotive systems shall 
be assigned and sustained by the organization. 
 
8.2 At project level 
Project manager has basically the overall 
responsibility for ensuring functional safety, including 
the assignment of someone in the role of safety 
manager for his project.   
Safety manager is in charge of providing support and 
information to the project manager for any decision 
regarding functional safety. Safety manager is also 
responsible for functional safety management tasks: 
• Planning and follow-up of safety-directed 
activities during product development phase 
such as requirement capture, safety analyses, 
V&V. 
• Set up of confirmation measures for an 
independent safety assessment of the project, 
under the form of audits on processes, reviews 
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of artefacts, and/or assessment of safety 
performance of the product, those measures 
being commensurate with the ASIL applicable to 
the project. 
• Compilation of the safety case of the project that 
gives evidence that processes have been 
carried out and that the results are acceptable 
with regard to safety. 
 
8.3 OEM / supplier relationships 
ISO26262 will require formalisation of relationships 
between all participants of the supply chain from 
OEM which is the end-customer to tier n suppliers 
whatever the business model is: acquisition, co-
development, etc… 
Major topics have to be clarified earliest in the 
project, i.e. at RFQ and project initiation phases. 
Those include: 
• Capability and experience of suppliers in 
developing products in compliance with 
ISO26262 to targeted ASIL(s). 
• Definition (or pre-definition) of safety goals 
applicable to the product with associated ASILs 
and quantitative targets for hardware random 
failures. 
• Job split between OEM and supplier regarding 
functional safety activities, including respective 
contribution in safety analyses, safety validation, 
independent safety assessment and field 
monitoring. This implies tight co-ordination for 
processes, milestones and tools. 
9. Adaptation of safety lifecycle 
9.1 Selection of the use case 
Since development of E/E systems in automotive 
industry is not only dedicated to brand new products, 
ISO26262 will provide guidance for the following 
real-life use cases: 
• Reuse in a new environment of already existing 
products without changes, 
• Upgrade of already existing products for a new 
application, 
• Development of brand new products from 
scratch. 
Selection of relevant use case is based on an impact 
analysis: 
• For a carried over product, i.e. the one that is 
reused and installed without any change in a 
new environment, integration of this product 
within the new target environment and validation 
at system level are performed according to 
ISO26262, provided it is shown there is no 
impact on the product itself.  
• Upgrade of a product for a new application 
implies design and/or implementation changes 
to the product. Design changes may result from 
requirements modification, functional or 
performance enhancement, cost optimization, 
etc., while implementation changes may be 
caused by changes in calibration data, 
correction of implementation errors such as 
software bug fixes, upgrade of production tools. 
In such case, the safety lifecycle is partly 
revisited depending on the impact of change 
with specific emphasis to potential side effects. 
The resulting product is integrated in the vehicle 
and validated at system level according to 
ISO26262. 
• In case of development of a new product from 
scratch, the complete safety lifecycle is applied. 
 
9.2 Proven-in-use argumentation 
Additionally, ISO26262 will provide guidance for 
proven-in-use argumentation. Proven-in-use 
argumentation for an existing product is an alternate 
means of compliance with the application of the 
safety lifecycle when field data are available. It may 
be used when: 
• the product is carried over on a new target 
vehicle or engine, or reused for a new 
application, or  
• the product has been developed prior to the 
release of ISO26262 and/or to another safety 
standard, or 
• The product is COTS product not specifically 
developed for automotive industry. 
Proven-in-use argumentation relies on the following 
criteria: 
• configuration management during service 
period, 
• change control, including those changes that 
may have been introduced since the previous 
usage of the product, 
• nature and availability of data resulting from 
development of the product, 
• analogy between future conditions of use and 
those encountered during the service period 
• relevance of service history 
Once those criteria are fulfilled, proven-in-use 
argumentation allows adjustment of reduction or 
suppression of design and implementation measures 
related to the nature of the product and its intended 
use. 
10. Achievement and perspective 
The goal for release of ISO26262 as an international 
standard is 2010. 
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A Publicly Available Specification should be issued 
mid-2008 for public commenting and feedback 
purposes. 
The current work of ISO/TC22/SC3/WG16 has 
established a common understanding of what is 
functional safety of E/E systems within a dedicated 
expert community of OEMs and suppliers. It is in the 
process of reaching a consensus on current state-of-
the-art regarding all aspects of functional safety, 
including system, hardware and software.  
Once this international standard will be issued, it will 
define an international state-of-the-art for the 
development of such systems and therefore will be 
very useful for al stakeholders in the design of 
electronically implemented functions and systems in 
the automotive industry. 
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12. Glossary 
E/E system: An electrical/electronic system that consists of 
electrical and/or electronic elements, including 
programmable electronic elements, power supplies, 
sensors and other input devices, data highways and 
other communication paths, and actuators and 
other output devices. 
OEM: Original Equipment Manufacturer – it designates a 
vehicle manufacturer 
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